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INTRODUCTION 
Around a large table in the Orange County Superior Courthouse sits a group 
of important women discussing difficult juvenile court cases. Commissioner Jane 
Shade, the presiding judge of the Orange County Girls Court, leads the meeting. 
Five cases are on calendar for the afternoon, and those around the table listen 
intently as one of the social workers talks about the first girl’s week. The 
Department of Health representative then discusses the girl’s mental health status. 
Next, the Department of Education representative talks about the girl’s recent 
performance in school. These women clearly know the girl well and they discuss 
her situation in detail. Commissioner Shade draws the discussion on this first case 
to a close, noting how well the girl is doing and what progress she has made since 
her last court date. Only then do they move on to the second girl on calendar. The 
attention to detail and enthusiasm with which the girls are discussed at the 
meeting make clear that these women take seriously their roles as mentors. 
During the summer of 2010, I had the privilege of working at the Orange 
County Juvenile Court. While there, I observed the proceedings in delinquency 
courtrooms, dependency courtrooms, and the Girls Court. I also observed the 
creation of the Boys Court. The Boys and Girls Courts are gender-segregated1 
collaborative courts, which serve to focus attention on the individual boys and 
girls in the juvenile dependency system.2 Throughout the summer, I was able to 
observe the enthusiasm and dedication of the people who work at the Orange 
County Juvenile Court, and I saw how those sentiments transferred to the creation 
and implementation of their Girls and Boys Courts. 
The juvenile justice system has evolved in recent years. For instance, the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (“JDAI”) 
 
1. While the terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably in the literature regarding 
gender segregation, the term gender is used to refer to gender and sex segregation in the context of 
the Boys and Girls Courts. This is because, presumably, if a male individual identifies as a female and 
lives life as a female, she will be grouped in the Girls Court rather than the Boys Court, thus 
segregating by the cultural notion of gender. Similarly, a sex-typical male will be grouped in the Boys 
Court, thus segregating by sex. These two examples illustrate that Boys and Girls Courts allow for 
classifications based on both gender and sex. This Note uses the word gender to refer to these 
classifications in the Boys and Girls Courts because ultimately, the classification is based on gender if 
it takes into account an individual’s gender identity when classifying that individual, whether or not 
that gender identity is consistent with his or her sex. However, the word sex is used instead of the 
word gender when addressing the biological arguments that arise in this context. For a discussion of 
the biological and cultural differences between the terms, see Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or 
Gender Inequality?, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 941, 945–46 (1989). 
2. See Collaborative Courts, OCCOURTS, http://www.occourts.org/directory/collaborative-
courts (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (Collaborative courts “are specialized court tracks that address 
underlying issues that may be present in the lives of persons who come before the court on criminal, 
juvenile, or dependency matters. These life-changing programs involve active judicial monitoring, a 
team approach to decision making, and include the participation of a variety of different agencies, 
such as Probation and health treatment providers.”). 
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strives to find alternatives to incarceration for juveniles.3 Some counties have 
developed programs centered on the individual needs of boys and girls in juvenile 
detention centers.4 Hawaii has developed a Girls Court to help girls navigate the 
delinquency system,5 focusing not on the detention aspects of the system, but 
rather on structuring the girls’ court visits and other activities in ways conducive to 
their rehabilitation. Similarly, on the dependency side, the Orange County Superior 
Court has developed collaborative Boys and Girls Courts to help dependent 
youths navigate the court system and learn to cope with the various issues they 
face. 
While these programs have made a valuable contribution to the innovation 
of the juvenile justice system, gender-segregated courts raise several equal 
protection concerns. The gender-segregated court programs serve admirable 
purposes, but many of them are arguably unrelated to gender segregation. For that 
reason, they are unlikely to meet intermediate scrutiny, the standard applied to 
analyze an equal protection challenge on the basis of gender, and are therefore 
likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
addition, the hiring of all-female staffs in the Girls Court programs is likely an act 
of impermissible employment discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
This Note focuses on two questions related to Equal Protection. First, it 
analyzes the issues raised by gender-segregated juvenile courts in both the 
dependency and delinquency systems. Second, it addresses the equal protection 
and statutory issues raised by the hiring of all-female staffs for the Girls Courts. 
This Note discusses three collaborative courts—Orange County’s Girls and Boys 
Courts, which are dependency courts, and Hawaii’s Girls Court, which is a 
delinquency court.6 Part I describes the juvenile justice system in general and the 
Orange County and Hawaii collaborative courts in particular. Part II discusses the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, determines whether these courts satisfy that 
standard, and discusses possible alternatives that will more likely satisfy the 
standard. Part III examines the employment discrimination concerns raised by the 
 
3. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http://www.aecf 
.org/MajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (JDAI 
“was designed to support the Casey Foundation’s vision that all youth involved in the juvenile justice 
system have opportunities to develop into healthy, productive adults. . . . JDAI focuses on the 
juvenile detention component of the juvenile justice system because youth are often unnecessarily or 
inappropriately detained at great expense, with long-lasting negative consequences for both public 
safety and youth development.”). 
4. Thomas Carroll, Gender and Juvenile Justice: New Courts, Programs Address Needs of Girls, YOUTH 
L. NEWS (July–Sept. 2009), http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2009/july_september_2009/ 
gender_and_juvenile_justice_new_courts_programs_address_needs_of_girls. 
5. Welcome to Hawaiʻi Girls Court, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org (last visited  
Mar. 30, 2012). 
6. These are court programs, rather than detention facilities, which raise other constitutional 
issues. 
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all-female staff of the Girls Courts in order to determine the feasibility of 
implementing or maintaining these structures from an employment standpoint. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
COLLABORATIVE COURTS 
This Part provides background information on the juvenile justice system, as 
well as a specific look at each collaborative court at issue in this Note. Section A 
discusses the juvenile justice system. Section B discusses the different 
circumstances of boys and girls in relation to this system, providing context for 
why individual attention to the distinct situations of male and female offenders is 
necessary. Section C describes the Orange County collaborative dependency 
courts. Finally, Section D provides an overview of Hawaii’s collaborative 
delinquency court. 
A. Description of the Juvenile Justice System 
The juvenile justice system has two separate components: delinquency and 
dependency. The delinquency system determines whether a minor has broken the 
law and how he or she should be punished or rehabilitated.7 The dependency 
system, on the other hand, protects children who have been abused or neglected, 
physically, emotionally, or both, by their primary caregivers.8 The dependency 
system takes children out of harmful family situations and plays a temporary role 
until a child can be placed in a permanent home, whether with the child’s family, a 
legal guardian, or an adoptive family.9 The goal of the dependency system is to 
place children in the best possible familial environment.10 The delinquency and 
dependency systems are necessarily linked; children who have been abused or 
neglected “are at greater risk for delinquency, violence, self-destructive behaviors,” 
and other negative outcomes than children who have not been abused or 
neglected.11 
Gender-segregated collaborative courts exist in both the dependency and the 
delinquency systems. Orange County’s programs are dependency courts, 
addressing the needs of youths when they have been neglected or abused. Hawaii’s 
Girls Court program is a delinquency court, dealing with the retribution and 
rehabilitation of juveniles who have committed crimes. While there is a difference 
 
7. LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency Cases, 47 
FAM. CT. REV. 605, 613 (2009) (quoting MICHAEL D. GRIMES, PATCHING UP THE CRACKS: A CASE 
STUDY OF JUVENILE COURT REFORM 12 (2005)). 
8. Id. 
9. THE 15TH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN IN ORANGE COUNTY 
119 (2009), available at http://ochealthinfo.com/docs/occp/report2009/index.htm [hereinafter 
CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN]. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 117. 
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between dependency and delinquency court proceedings, the line between the two 
is very thin. Research has shown that children who have been abused or neglected, 
often resulting in their entrance into the dependency system, “are at greater risk 
for delinquency . . . .”12 Later, when children turn eighteen and leave the 
dependency system, they typically lack “adequate independent living skills.”13 The 
consequence is that many experience “incarceration, homelessness, poverty, and 
under/unemployment.”14 Thus, young adults previously in the dependency system 
often become involved in the adult criminal system. For this reason, both 
delinquency and dependency collaborative courts focus on many of the same 
issues. 
These collaborative courts differ from traditional juvenile courts, where 
meetings about the boys and girls happen only in the courtroom. In traditional 
delinquency courtrooms, the only people present are the child, the child’s parent 
or guardian in some cases, the child’s attorney, the District Attorney, a court clerk, 
a court reporter, and the judge. In traditional dependency courtrooms, attorneys 
are generally present for all parties, including the child, the parents, and the 
Department of Social Services. Many of the same parties are involved in both 
traditional proceedings and in collaborative court meetings. Rather than acting as 
adversaries as they would in traditional court proceedings, however, these 
individuals work together in the collaborative courts to reach the best solution for 
each child. Of course, the goal of all juvenile court proceedings is to achieve the 
best outcome for each child. Arguably, though, the collaborative courts are more 
effective at reaching the goal because all parties strive to work together. The 
ultimate focus of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation,15 and a 
nonadversarial conversation among various parties working together facilitates 
that outcome. 
Other counties have implemented collaborative juvenile courts of varying 
structures. The Middle School Education Court (MSEC) in Santa Clara County, 
for example, strives “to help foster children attain academic success through 
 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 121. 
14. Id. For a study on the transition from foster care into adulthood focusing on a sample of 
young people from Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois, see Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of 
Former Foster Youth, CHAPINHALL, http://www.chapinhall.org/research/report/midwest-evaluation-
adult-functioning-former-foster-youth (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). The study found that forty-five 
percent of young men and eighteen percent of young women reported that they had been 
incarcerated when the study followed up on the participants at age twenty-three or twenty-four. See 
MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER 
FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 23 AND 24, at 7 (2010), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/ 
sites/default/files/Midwest_Study_ES_Age_23_24.pdf. Participants of the study earned a median 
income of $8,000 per year, compared to a median of $18,300 for their peers who were not a part of 
the foster care system. Id. at 5. 
15. Brenda Gordon, Note, A Criminal’s Justice or a Child’s Injustice? Trends in the Waiver of Juvenile 
Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 197 (1999). 
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appropriate educational placements and support.”16 Various child welfare 
advocates collaborate to help the approximately twenty-four youths in this 
program.17 Santa Clara County also has a Girls Drug Court, with a treatment 
program that serves as an alternative to incarceration.18 San Mateo County has a 
delinquency Girls Court, where the treatment program at the detention facility, 
known as the Margaret Kemp Camp for girls, provides counseling, speakers, yoga 
classes for anger management, and other programs specifically focused on 
successfully rehabilitating the girls.19 Alameda County has a treatment program for 
girls convicted of prostitution offenses that allows girls to avoid detention at 
juvenile hall and instead attend treatment programs while remaining in their 
communities.20 This Note focuses on and compares Orange County’s dependency 
Boys and Girls Courts and Hawaii’s delinquency Girls Court because they are 
gender-segregated court systems rather than gender-segregated detention facilities, 
and because they have similar structures despite their differences. 
B. Boys and Girls in the Juvenile Justice System 
Male delinquents outnumber female delinquents in the juvenile court 
system.21 “In 2006, arrests of boys represented more than [seventy percent] of all 
juvenile arrests.”22 Even so, the number of girls entering the system over the past 
ten years has significantly increased.23 In 1980, girls accounted for twenty percent 
of juvenile arrests. That number jumped to twenty-nine percent in 2002 and 2003, 
and stayed there in 2006.24 Although the number of female arrests continues to 
rise, girls are still considered the “forgotten few” in the juvenile justice system.25 A 
limited number of studies focus “specifically on girls’ court processing, and many 
important studies do not include girls in their samples or do not analyze the data 
separately” from the boys’ data.26 
Both boys and girls in the dependency system are often victims of abuse and 
neglect, which can potentially lead to delinquency, violence, self-destructive 
 
16. Kristy Luk, New Juvenile Dependency Court Focuses on Foster Youth Education, YOUTH L.  
NEWS (Oct.–Dec. 2011), http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2011/winter_2011_2012/new 
_juvenile_dependency_court_focuses_on_foster_youth_education. 
17. Id. 
18. Carroll, supra note 4. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Anne Bowen Poulin, Female Delinquents: Defining Their Place in the Justice System, 1996 WIS. L. 
Rev. 541, 541 (1996). 
22. Fact Sheet: Juvenile Delinquency, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs 
.gov/hsp/08/boys/FactSheets/jd/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
23. Alison S. Burke, Girls and the Juvenile Court: An Historical Examination of the Treatment of Girls, 
47 CRIM. L. BULL. 117, 117 (2011). 
24. Id. at 117–18. 
25. Id. at 118 (quoting Ilene R. Bergsmann, The Forgotten Few: Juvenile Female Offenders, 53 FED. 
PROBATION 73 (1989)). 
26. Id. 
UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2012  2:14 PM 
2012] A NEW APPROACH TO JUVENILE JUSTICE 779 
 
behaviors, and substance abuse.27 Youths in the dependency system also 
“experience emotional trauma resulting from [the] chronic rejection, loss of 
affection, [and] betrayal” they have experienced as a result of the neglect they have 
suffered.28 
Girls are more likely to be arrested for status or moral offenses, a tendency 
that juvenile courts, at their inception, were designed to address.29 Status offenses 
are offenses related to conduct that would be legal for an adult but illegal for a 
child.30 Examples of such conduct are truancy, running away, and possession of 
alcohol.31 In the early twentieth century, eighty percent of girls brought into the 
juvenile justice system were charged with offenses associated with immorality 
rather than criminal offenses.32 Today, girls continue to be arrested for status 
offenses at higher rates than boys.33 Females “account for the majority of arrests 
for certain types of offenses such as running away—fifty-nine percent—and 
prostitution and commercialized vice—sixty-nine percent.”34 The fact that girls are 
arrested and jailed for these moral offenses is a problem because the delinquency 
system is more punitive now than it was in the past.35 Although girls “are generally 
brought into the system for lesser offenses than most male offenders, their case 
dispositions are often as severe or more severe than their male counterparts.”36 
Generally, the triggering events that lead to boys’ involvement in the juvenile 
justice system are different than those affecting girls. This generalization may 
highlight “natural” distinctions between boys’ and girls’ delinquency even before 
arrest.37 Victimization is a risk factor for boys and girls, but it seems to be a 
“stronger predictor among females.”38 Ninety-two percent of girls in the 
California juvenile justice system “report some form of emotional, physical, or 
sexual abuse.”39 Self-reported abuse is significantly lower in boys, although boys 
 
27. CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN, supra note 9, at 117. 
28. Id. 
29. Poulin, supra note 22, at 546. 
30. Laura A. Barnickol, Note, The Disparate Treatment of Males and Females Within the Juvenile 
Justice System, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 429, 430 (2000). 
31. Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., At-Risk and Delinquent Girls in the Juvenile 
Justice System, WASH. ST. DEP’T SOC. & HEALTH SERVICES 3 (2008), www.dshs.wa.gov/word/ojj/ 
GirlsPolicyBriefFinalMarch08.doc. 
32. Burke, supra note 23, at 119. 
33. See Poulin, supra note 21, at 546; Girls and Boys in the Juvenile Justice System: Are There 
Differences That Warrant Policy Changes in the Juvenile Justice System?, FUTURE CHILD. (2008), http://www 
.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/highlights/18_02_Highlights_08.pdf [hereinafter Girls 
and Boys]. 
34. Girls and Boys, supra note 33. 
35. Poulin, supra note 21, at 542. 
36. Barnickol, supra note 30, at 446. 
37. Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., supra note 31, at 2. 
38. Elizabeth Cauffman, Understanding the Female Offender, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 119, 129–30 
(2008). 
39. Id. at 130. 
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may be more likely to underreport.40 Family discord is also a risk factor for both 
genders, but “[p]oor emotional ties to family are more strongly associated with 
violence in girls than in boys.”41 For both males and females, drug and alcohol 
abuse and failure in school can lead to involvement in criminal activity.42 
However, as noted by Lorri Caprista, the supervising probation officer in an all-
girl San Mateo County detention program, when girls get into trouble with the 
law, they tend to blame themselves rather than others.43 As a result, girls are more 
likely to engage in self-harm than boys.44 
The separation of girls’ and boys’ programs acknowledges that girls generally 
react differently than boys do to traumatic events, even when the actual events 
may be identical.45 Addressing the differences in the ways girls and boys respond 
to the difficult events in their lives is a primary focus of gender-segregated court 
programs. The importance of addressing these differences has increased with the 
growth in the number of girls in the juvenile justice system.46 In sum, gender-
segregated courts arose to provide individual attention to the often distinct needs 
of boys and girls because girls have historically received harsher punishments for 
status offenses, because girls react differently to external stimuli and tend to enter 
the delinquency and dependency systems for different reasons than boys, and 
because girls and boys tend to react differently to traumatic events. 
C. Orange County’s Dependency Courts 
Each of Orange County’s dependency Boys and Girls Courts has about 
thirty youths—a miniscule percentage of the total number of youths in the Orange 
County dependency system. On average, 3,500 children in Orange County are 
removed from abusive home environments each year.47 
Judge Carolyn Kirkwood, the presiding judge of the Juvenile Court from 
2008 through 2010, found teenage girls to be a population that was both generally 
underserved and also particularly at-risk in Orange County.48 Commissioner Jane 
Shade hears all Girls Court cases, and every member of the Girls Court staff is 
female. The collaborators include the judge, attorneys, court staff, and 
representatives from probation, the Department of Education, the Department of 
Health, and Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA).49 The thin line between 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Carroll, supra note 4. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. About Orangewood Children’s Foundation, ORANGEWOOD CHILD. FOUND., http://www 
.orangewoodfoundation.org/about.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
48. Carroll, supra note 4. 
49. CASA volunteers advocate for abused and neglected children in the dependency system. 
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the juvenile dependency and delinquency systems is apparent at these meetings; 
probation officers often attend because the girls in this dependency court are also 
often involved in the delinquency system. 
Orange County’s Boys Court program aims to “give the youth most at risk 
some dedicated, specialized attention that helps them finish high school, learn life 
skills, live in a more stable environment and develop confidence.”50 Judge Maria 
Hernandez hears all cases in this court, which has many of the same staff 
members as the Girls Court. (Unlike Girls Court, which has an all-female staff, 
Boys Court does not have an all-male staff.) Judge Hernandez brings in male law 
enforcement officers to act as mentors for the boys.51 
Each week, the members of the Girls and Boys Court staff meet to talk in 
depth about each juvenile they have on calendar for the week. The juveniles do 
not attend these meetings, but the members of the court teams get to know the 
children through their discussions at these meetings, through their interactions 
with the children in the courtroom, and during other visits the staff members have 
with the juveniles. After the team meetings, the juveniles come to court for their 
sessions. 
The structure of the Orange County Girls and Boys Courts fosters genuine 
connections between the court staff and the youths in the programs. At meetings, 
the social workers show photos of the girls and boys and tell stories about them. 
Whenever one of the youths does well in school or succeeds in some way, the 
members of the court staff seem genuinely proud. Conversely, when a juvenile 
gets into trouble that leads to a delinquency proceeding, each member of the court 
staff seems to feel a heightened duty to help get him or her back on track. These 
courts strive to embody the notion of a collaborative effort to help the 
participating juvenile; the staff’s dedication to the programs and to the 
participating youths is worthy of recognition. 
One of the goals of the Orange County Girls and Boys Courts is to expose 
the youths to positive experiences. Many of the youths in the program have never 
left Orange County and have little conception of what the world beyond their 
locale has to offer. Through field trips to the planetarium, the Getty Museum, and 
Rogers Gardens, and activities such as rock climbing, surfing, and day hikes to 
local wilderness areas, the Orange County Girls and Boys Courts strive to show 
the youths in their courts the variety of experiences open to them. 
 
Their role is to help these children navigate through the system and to act as positive role models for 
the children they are assigned to. About Us, CASA FOR CHILD., http://www.casaforchildren.org/ 
site/c.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.5301303/k.6FB1/About_Us__CASA_for_Children.htm. (last visited Mar. 30, 
2012). 
50. Don J. DeBenedictis, O.C. to Start Teen Foster Boys’ Court, DAILY J., Aug. 12, 2010, at 4, 
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ocfoster-boyscourt.pdf. 
51. Id. 
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D. Hawaii Delinquency Court 
There are two main differences between the Orange County programs and 
the Hawaii program. First, Hawaii has only a Girls Court, with no separate 
counterpart for boys. Second, the Orange County programs are dependency 
courts, while the Hawaii program is a delinquency court. Like Orange County, the 
Hawaii Girls Court has an all-female staff and gender-specific programming. The 
programming “seeks to recognize the fundamental differences between male and 
female juvenile offenders as well as their different pathways to delinquency . . . .”52 
Probation officers in Hawaii’s mainstream system refer girls to the Girls 
Court.53 Participation in the Girls Court is voluntary; there are weekly activities 
that involve a high level of engagement and commitment not only from the 
participating girl, but also from her parent or guardian, as well as program staff. If 
either the girl or her family members are not willing to participate in the program, 
the mainstream delinquency system remains available as an option.54 
The Hawaii Girls Court convenes once every four weeks in an open court 
setting, in contrast to the dependency courts’ closed sessions. All of the girls in the 
court program, along with their families, attorneys, and probation officers, are 
present. The girls are able to learn from each others’ experiences and share with 
one another. Unlike Orange County’s dependency courts, where the bulk of these 
discussions are held in private, sensitive issues are addressed in a group setting, 
with all of the girls present. As discussed in Section II.C.2 of this Note, the 
structure of the Hawaii court may make it more difficult to mix boys and girls 
than in Orange County’s model. 
The Hawaii Girls Court program is structured “to address the unique needs 
of girls.”55 There is a focus on building relationships because “relationships are 
central in girl[s’] lives and . . . healthy connections are essential to their mental 
health and well-being.”56 The program also provides “service opportunities for 
girls to foster positive community involvement while instilling value on helping 
others.”57 Perhaps most importantly, the program adopts a holistic view, 
addressing “the whole girl in the context within which she lives and the influences 
that shape her life. This involves examining her physical and emotional/mental 
health, educational, and cultural domains.”58 In particular, the Hawaii Girls Court 
 
52. Welcome to Hawaiʻi Girls Court, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2012). 
53. Telephone Interview with Leah M. Nahale, Program Coordinator, Hawaii Girls Court 
(Dec. 29, 2011). 
54. Id. 
55. Our Mission & Program Values, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/mission.html 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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addresses trauma treatment, mental health treatment, domestic violence 
prevention, teen pregnancy prevention, and substance abuse treatment.59 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF GENDER-SEGREGATED COURTS 
Segregation by gender is inherently an equal protection issue, which means 
such segregation will be legal only if it meets intermediate scrutiny. Section A of 
this Part discusses why the existence of gender-segregated courts is an equal 
protection issue. Section B discusses the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable 
to the equal protection issues raised by gender-segregated courts. After the 
framework for the analysis is described, Section C discusses various arguments as 
to whether these courts meet equal protection analysis. 
A. Maintaining Gender-Segregated Courts Is Inherently an Equal Protection Issue 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says: “No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”60 In Frontiero v. Richardson, the 
Supreme Court explicitly held that dividing girls and boys into separate courts 
raises equal protection concerns. The Frontiero Court held that “classifications 
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, 
are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.”61 
The Court reaffirmed this holding in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,62 
acknowledging that an express separation of the sexes triggers equal protection 
analysis. The Court determined that “[b]ecause the challenged policy expressly 
discriminate[d] among applicants on the basis of sex, it [was] subject to scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”63 Mississippi 
University for Women involved a nursing school located at the all-female Mississippi 
University for Women.64 A male prospective student sought to enroll in the 
program, and although he was fully qualified, he was denied admission solely 
because of his gender.65 The school in Mississippi University for Women expressly 
discriminated based on gender, as do the gender-segregated juvenile courts 
discussed here. Therefore, this practice in the juvenile justice context should 
automatically raise an equal protection issue. 
The argument against the notion that the separation of individuals by gender 
is inherently an equal protection issue arises from the fact that, as a society, we 
 
59. Services & Partnering Agencies, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/partners.html 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
60. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
61. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (footnotes omitted). 
62. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
63. Id. at 723. 
64. Id. at 720. 
65. Id. at 720–21. 
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tolerate gender segregation in many contexts where we would not tolerate racial 
segregation, such as in bathrooms, locker rooms,66 and dressing rooms. This 
argument has two weaknesses. First, gender segregation in these contexts is still an 
equal protection issue; it is permitted because it arguably meets intermediate 
scrutiny.67 There are, however, strong arguments that gender segregation in the 
context of bathrooms, locker rooms, and dressing rooms does not always meet 
intermediate scrutiny, as in the case of transgendered individuals, who cannot 
comfortably use gender-segregated bathrooms.68 The second weakness, relevant in 
this situation, is that segregation by gender has different implications in different 
contexts. Gender segregation in the context of court programs is different from 
gender segregation in locker rooms. There are actual physical and biological 
differences between the sexes that give rise to privacy concerns that may justify 
segregation of bathrooms and dressing rooms. Separation by sex in any area that 
does not involve such privacy concerns, however, such as schools and court 
programs, runs a greater risk of being based on factors that may not survive even 
deferential levels of scrutiny, such as when based on assumptions of one gender’s 
inherent inferiority. Notions of inherent inferiority were the concern with racial 
segregation as well. For these reasons, separation on the basis of sex in all 
situations is an equal protection issue, and while it may meet intermediate scrutiny 
in some contexts, it may not in others. 
Further support for treating gender segregation as an equal protection issue 
is found in the equal protection analysis of racial segregation. In Johnson v. 
California, the Supreme Court considered the California Department of 
Corrections’ unwritten policy of segregating prisoners entering prison facilities by 
race for up to sixty days.69 The state’s purpose was to prevent violence involving 
racial gangs.70 Although the Court left it to the lower courts to determine whether 
the state’s policy of segregating based on race was permissible, the Court 
determined that all racial classifications must be analyzed using strict scrutiny, 
 
66. Sullivan v. City of Cleveland Heights, 869 F.2d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
young female hockey player on an otherwise all-male team was not denied equal protection, despite 
the fact that she was not allowed to change in the team locker room and instead had to change in the 
women’s restroom down the hall). 
67. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Just as 
the law tolerates same-sex restrooms or same-sex dressing rooms, but not white-only rooms, to 
accommodate privacy needs, Title VII allows an employer to respect a preference for same-sex health 
providers, but not same-race providers.”); see also Ludke v. Kuhn, 461 F.Supp. 86, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(recognizing protection of the privacy right as an important objective, but in the case of excluding a 
reporter from the Yankee locker room, the policy of excluding female sports reporters was not 
substantially related to the privacy of players. Thus, the sex segregation of the locker room was 
analyzed as an equal protection issue and, in this unique case, did not meet intermediate scrutiny.). 
68. See generally Alex More, Note, Coming out of the Water Closet: The Case Against Sex Segregated 
Bathrooms, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 297 (2008). 
69. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005). 
70. Id. 
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even if they are “benign” classifications.71 Thus, regardless of the context, racial 
segregation is an inherent equal protection issue. This is because of the fear that 
racial classifications “are motivated by an invidious purpose.”72 Therefore, 
pursuant to Johnson v. California, racial separation always requires equal protection 
analysis. 
In light of Johnson, the separation of boys and girls into different court 
programs should be viewed as inherently raising equal protection concerns. Sex, 
like race, is an immutable characteristic, and our society has historically 
discriminated on the basis of sex. Additionally, like race, sex is often a visible 
characteristic. Situations exist, of course, in which a person’s particular race or sex 
is not obvious, but they are nevertheless both visible characteristics. The risk of 
motivation by an invidious purpose with regard to sex segregation is similar to that 
presented in the context of racial segregation; the history of sex discrimination 
gives credence to the idea that separation by sex should be considered an inherent 
equal protection issue. While the context of segregation of court programs is 
different than that of detention facilities—the situation in Johnson—the 
comparison is relevant because Johnson declared racial segregation an inherent 
equal protection issue regardless of the context.73 The argument here is that 
gender segregation should also be viewed as an inherent equal protection issue 
regardless of the context. 
Even if separation of the genders is not inherently an equal protection issue, 
it is nevertheless an equal protection issue in this context because boys and girls 
are treated differently as a result of the separation. These differences will be 
discussed further in Section C. 
B. The Level of Scrutiny for Gender-Based Classifications 
In an equal protection analysis, the first step is to identify the government’s 
classification and determine how the government draws a distinction among 
individuals.74 In this instance, the distinction is based on gender. The second step 
of the analysis is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.75 For gender 
classifications, the appropriate level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.76 
When intermediate scrutiny applies, “a law is upheld if it is substantially 
related to an important government purpose . . . . The means used need not be 
necessary, but must have a ‘substantial relationship’ to the end being sought.”77 
The Court in United States v. Virginia reiterated the rule that “[p]arties who seek to 
 
71. Id. at 505. 
72. Id. at 506. 
73. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (3d ed. 2009). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 719. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly 
persuasive justification’ for that action.”78 
The government purpose, or justification, “must be genuine, not 
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of 
males and females.”79 In discussions of gender discrimination, often the focus is 
on discrimination against women. However, “[t]he fact that the classification 
expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it from 
scrutiny.”80 
Gender segregation may also meet intermediate scrutiny if the segregated 
facilities are “separate but substantially equal.” The Supreme Court in United States 
v. Virginia used the standard articulated in the lower court’s dissent, namely that an 
arrangement “that ‘could survive equal protection scrutiny’” is “single-sex schools 
with ‘substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs, funding, 
physical plant, administration and support services, . . . faculty[,] and library 
resources.’”81 This suggests that two separate gender-segregated programs, one for 
boys and the other for girls, could meet intermediate scrutiny if they are 
substantially equal. 
The doctrine of “separate but equal” arose in the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection analysis of racial segregation in schools.82 The Court in Plessy v. Ferguson 
expressly approved racial segregation in the education context, stating that “[i]f the 
civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other 
civilly or politically.”83 Over fifty years later, the Court in Sweatt v. Painter found 
that a separate law school for African American students was not “substantially 
equal.”84 The Court did not overrule “separate but equal,” but it required that the 
two establishments be substantially equal.85 Four years later, the Court famously 
held “separate but equal” impermissible with regard to racial segregation in public 
schools in Brown v. Board of Education.86 
Although the doctrine of “separate but equal” has been overruled in the 
context of racial segregation, it continues to be used in the context of gender 
segregation. The Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia used the “substantially 
equal” language from Sweatt v. Painter and altogether neglected to mention Brown’s 
 
78. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 
511 U.S. 127, 136–37 (1994), and Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
79. Id. at 533. 
80. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1979)). 
81. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 n.17 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 44 
F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting)). 
82. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1897). 
83. Id. at 551–52. 
84. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
85. Id. at 635. 
86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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absolute prohibition of racial segregation.87 Because “substantially equal” is an 
equal protection analysis for gender-segregated programs, the standard is still 
intermediate scrutiny. 
As evidenced by the use of the “substantially equal” standard for gender 
segregation, once an equal protection issue is raised, the courts view gender 
differently than race. This discussion goes beyond the determination of whether 
there is an equal protection issue to whether the Equal Protection Clause has been 
violated, but it is interesting to compare the analyses for racial and gender 
segregation. For example, racial integration facilitates racial equality. With regard 
to gender equality, however, some argue that separation facilitates equality by 
helping females come out of their shells and by potentially closing the gender 
gap.88 In addition, there are actual differences between the genders, both 
physiological and psychological.89 As discussed in Section II.C.4, attributes that are 
unique to one sex may justify government action that segregates by sex, as long as 
the attributes are not based on stereotypes.90 
C. Do the Courts at Issue Meet Intermediate Scrutiny? 
There may be various government purposes at work in maintaining gender 
segregation in collaborative courts. This Section analyzes whether such segregation 
is substantially related to such purposes. Subsection 1 discusses remedying past 
discrimination as an important purpose for the gender-segregated courts. 
Subsection 2 discusses the exclusivity of the programs as an important purpose. 
Subsection 3 addresses whether diversity of court programs available can serve as 
an important purpose for gender-segregated courts. Subsection 4 discusses 
whether addressing the individual needs of the juveniles is an important purpose 
substantially related to the gender segregation of these courts, and Subsection 5 
analyzes whether the dependency Boys and Girls Courts are “separate but 
substantially equal.” Subsection 6 draws conclusions from the analysis, primarily 
that Orange County’s dependency courts are most likely to meet the intermediate 
scrutiny standard if they ensure their Boys and Girls Courts are substantially equal, 
 
87. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 n.17 (1996) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 
44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citing Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634)). 
88. Rebecca A. Kiselewich, Note, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex Public 
Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217, 252 (2008). 
89. Id. There is a blurring of the lines between biological and cultural differences between the 
sexes because of the cultural aspects of gender. Because this complex issue goes beyond the scope of 
this Note, it will not be discussed here. The purpose of this Note is to present the equal protection 
arguments as they have been made. For further discussion on this topic, see More, supra note 68, at 
301–05; see also Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a Restroom Labeled 
“Other,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1235–47 (1997); see also Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative 
Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 87–92 
(2008). 
90. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights 
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893–900 (1971). 
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and that the best argument for the constitutionality of Hawaii’s delinquency Girls 
Court is the exclusivity of the benefits afforded to the girls participating in the 
court. 
1. Remedying Past Discrimination in Juvenile Court Programs 
The Supreme Court has allowed disparate treatment of genders when the 
purpose behind it is remedial.91 For example, in Califano v. Webster, “the Court 
upheld a congressional scheme that used a more favorable formula for women” 
than men in calculating social security retirement benefits.92 The Court reasoned 
that “[r]eduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women 
caused by the long history of discrimination against women has been recognized 
as . . . an important governmental objective.”93 
This analysis necessitates a look at the history of discrimination against girls 
in the delinquency system, the remedying of which may be an important purpose 
substantially related to the establishment of an all-girls court. Due to “the system’s 
focus on male offenders, gender bias has been a long-term problem within the 
juvenile justice system.”94 As a result “of this gender bias, young delinquent 
females are less likely to receive the effective treatment upon which the juvenile 
justice system’s parens patriae principle is based.”95 Because society typically views 
rebellious behavior among female adolescents as more deviant and less acceptable, 
girls are more likely to be arrested and to receive harsher sentences for status 
offenses, even though boys commit an equal number of such offenses.96 Research 
shows that adolescent female offenders generally receive harsher sentences than 
young male offenders receive for the same crimes.97 This is because girls are more 
often detained for status offenses, ostensibly in order to protect them.98 Status 
offenses are seen as less serious when committed by males, arguably because of 
the societal norms that girls will be obedient and boys will inevitably misbehave.99 
These societal norms make it less socially acceptable for a girl to act out, so she is 
more likely to be punished than a boy who commits the same act. 
The juvenile court was originally perceived as an entity charged with 
preventing girls from becoming “morally depraved,” which resulted in harsher 
sentencing for “moral” crimes.100 Few studies of the delinquency courts focus on 
 
91. David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 51, 
105 (2011). 
92. Id. 
93. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977). 
94. Barnickol, supra note 30, at 441. 
95. Id. at 442. 
96. Id. at 438. 
97. Id. at 446. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Burke, supra note 23, at 120. 
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girls’ court processing, and “many important studies do not include girls in their 
samples or do not analyze the data separately.”101 Consequently, any changes 
made to the delinquency system as a result of these studies likely do not take into 
account the needs of females in the system. It is important to note, however, that 
this Subsection focuses only on the delinquency system. While the delinquency 
and dependency systems are closely related, this discrimination argument would be 
difficult to apply to the Orange County Boys and Girls Courts because of the lack 
of evidence of past discrimination in the dependency system. 
The Supreme Court, “[i]n evaluating other affirmative action programs . . . 
has insisted upon a particularized showing of discrimination within the setting or 
institution in question, and has rejected generalized statistical data about the 
industry-wide discrimination. This requirement applies even under the ‘relaxed’ 
scrutiny of the intermediate test for gender discrimination,” as in Mississippi 
University for Women.102 United States v. Virginia established that a “particularized 
showing of disadvantage or exclusion” could justify a “remedial single-sex 
program.”103 As articulated in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Court has 
required “some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit 
involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy 
such discrimination.”104 In Mississippi University for Women, the Court acknowledged 
that “[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can 
be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is 
disproportionately burdened” by prior discrimination.105 However, “the mere 
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which 
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory 
scheme.”106 In Mississippi University for Women, the school “made no showing that 
women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain 
positions of leadership in that field.”107 For that reason, the Court did not uphold 
the compensatory purpose as a sufficiently important one. 
Justifying gender segregation in these collaborative courts on the grounds of 
remedying past discrimination would require a particularized showing of 
discrimination on the part of the court in question. The delinquency Girls Court 
was created due to the influx of girls entering the delinquency system in Hawaii, 
 
101. Id. at 118. 
102. Galen Sherwin, Single-Sex Schools and the Antisegregation Principle, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 35, 60 (2005). 
103. Id. at 59. 
104. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
105. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (quoting Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)). 
106. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107. Id. at 729. 
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not because of any cited discrimination in that system.108 In order for the Girls 
Court to assert in court that its separate treatment of girls is justified, it would 
need to show that remedying past discrimination (such as harsher sentences for 
girls convicted of the same crime as boys)—not a demographic shift like the 
increase in girls entering delinquency—is the program’s purpose. 
A showing of past discrimination in Orange County’s dependency system 
would also be necessary in order to justify the dependency Boys and Girls Courts 
on the basis of remedying past discrimination. One way that the Girls Court could 
demonstrate discrimination that might then justify remedial action could be a 
showing that girls were more often left in large group homes rather than in 
placements with foster families because group homes have more strict security 
and protect girls from their supposed tendencies to commit immoral acts. In the 
context of the Boys Court, past discrimination that may justify the Boys Court 
could be, for example, a showing that boys were left in group homes because of a 
stereotypical notion that they would not thrive amid the closer relationships 
formed in foster homes. Past discrimination of these types or others, if proven, 
would justify gender segregation in the Girls and Boys Courts. 
2. Exclusivity of Benefits Afforded Each Gender 
An argument for the constitutionality of gender-segregated courts is that 
certain programs benefitting one gender cannot be effectively provided if the 
other gender is present. In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court considered 
the argument that “[a]lterations to accommodate women would necessarily be 
‘radical,’ so ‘drastic,’ . . . as to transform, indeed ‘destroy,’ [the Virginia Military 
Institute (VMI)]’s program” and that “[n]either sex would be favored by the 
transformation.”109 Virginia argued that “[m]en would be deprived of the unique 
opportunity currently available to them; women would not gain that opportunity 
because their participation would ‘eliminat[e] the very aspects of [the] program 
that distinguish [VMI] from . . . other institutions of higher education in 
Virginia.’”110 Despite these arguments, the Court held that the separate male and 
female programs violated equal protection. 
Similarly, such a justification would likely not be upheld with regard to the 
Orange County dependency courts. Each court has a different focus, and boys 
and girls have different needs when it comes to their delinquency and dependency 
issues. There is sufficient overlap between the two groups, however, that they 
could be combined without “eliminat[ing] the very aspects of [the] program that 
distinguish”111 Girls Court from Boys Court, and both courts from every other 
 
108. Why have a Girls Court?, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/faq.html#why. (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
109. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540 (1996). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
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court program in the country. Although part of what distinguishes these courts is 
their gender-specific nature, the most significant characteristic of both the Boys 
and Girls Courts is the individual attention given to the participating youths. For 
this reason, the discussions that take place in Girls Court are often similar to those 
in Boys Court. These discussions occur in the out-of-court meetings with the Girls 
and Boys Court staffs, as well as in the confidential court sessions the youths 
attend individually. Thus, the only situations in which boys and girls would 
interact are during field trips and group activities. Integrating the Boys and Girls 
Courts would involve substantial changes only to the structure of the group 
activities. Changes to pre-court meetings would be minor, requiring discussions 
about boys and girls in the same meeting. Another change would be the presence 
of male staff members in these meetings and in court proceedings that now have 
only female staff members. Implementation of this change would be a minor 
administrative matter, easily accomplished, although such a change may be 
substantial in the eyes of a girl who may be uncomfortable discussing intimate 
details of her life with males in the courtroom. For these girls, it may be possible 
for all males to leave the courtroom temporarily. Additionally, the fact that all 
sensitive discussions about, or with, the youths are in meetings away from other 
youths would not change. Thus, any sensitive discussions would not be hindered 
by the presence of youths of the opposite gender. The only substantial change 
would be that group activities would include members of both genders, which 
would give boys and girls opportunities to interact with one another. 
In contrast, with regard to the Hawaii delinquency court, gender integration 
may actually eliminate the aspects that make the court effective. Part of the Hawaii 
court’s focus is to have the girls share their experiences in open court.112 Unlike 
the Orange County courts, where each youth is discussed separately and has a 
confidential court appearance, the girls in the Hawaii court have court appearances 
as a group. This raises issues of how to have open discussions about gender-
specific topics if boys and girls are in the conversation together. Youths may be 
hesitant to share sensitive information if they feel they will be judged by 
individuals of the other gender. For this reason, integrating the Hawaii Girls Court 
would eliminate some of the aspects that may make it effective. This is a strong 
argument for the constitutionality of the Hawaii Girls Court, but a court would be 
unlikely to find the Girls Court constitutional without a similar program for boys. 
Thus, the Hawaii court could create a “separate but substantially equal” court for 
boys. This concept will be further discussed in Subsection 5. Another possibility 
would be to keep the group court appearances gender-segregated while integrating 
all of the other activities involved in the court, such as field trips, job fairs, and 
community service activities. Integration during these programs may further the 
 
112. What is Girls Court?, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/aboutus.html. (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
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goals of these collaborative courts because it will give boys and girls a chance to 
interact with one another. 
3. Diversity of Programs Available to Juveniles 
Increasing the diversity of available court options is another possible 
justification for maintaining these gender-segregated courts. This type of diversity 
is different from racial, gender, or religious diversity, and poses an interesting 
argument to consider in this context. Most notably, this diversity justification has 
been used in the context of gender-segregated schools. The Office for Civil Rights 
of the U.S. Department of Education “specifically identifies diversity as one of the 
important governmental objectives being served through allowing the option of 
single-sex education.”113 The Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia 
acknowledged that diversity in the types of educational atmosphere offered can 
serve the public good, but decided that it was not a sufficiently important purpose 
to meet intermediate scrutiny.114 The Court affirmed that “[a] policy of diversity 
which aims to provide an array of educational opportunities, including single-
gender institutions, must do more than favor one gender.”115 A justification for 
state action “must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in 
fact differently grounded.”116 
The diversity argument is strained in the context of the gender-segregated 
juvenile courts because these courts are not just one choice among many. In 
Orange County, boys and girls are chosen to participate based on their level of 
need for special assistance. They can opt out of the collaborative court, but the 
alternative is the mainstream dependency court system. The same is true for the 
Hawaii Girls Court.117 In both cases, there is no alternative collaborative court that 
is gender-integrated. While the Boys and Girls Courts offer another path for some 
youths in the juvenile court system, the argument that this is just one choice 
among many choices cannot be sustained in this context. Similarly, in United States 
v. Virginia, the diversity justification was not upheld because Virginia failed to 
show that VMI was established or maintained with a view to diversifying the 
educational opportunities available.118 The same is true here. The availability of 
these courts may be a stepping-stone on the way to having a diverse range of court 
options available to the youths, but it remains to be seen whether these courts are 
the first of many options. 
 
113. Kiselewich, supra note 88, at 241. 
114. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524. 
115. Id. at 525 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
116. Id. at 535–36. 
117. Telephone Interview with Leah M. Nahale, Program Coordinator, Hawaii Girls Court 
(Dec. 29, 2011). 
118. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 539. 
UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2012  2:14 PM 
2012] A NEW APPROACH TO JUVENILE JUSTICE 793 
 
In order for the diversity argument to be upheld in this context, there would 
need to be evidence of an effort to continue to diversify the range of court 
programs available in the juvenile justice system. This would show that 
establishing diversity in court programs is an actual state purpose, not a 
“rationalization[] for [an] action[] in fact differently grounded.”119 Eventually, a 
gender-segregated collaborative court would need to be one option among many 
that youths could choose from. It would help if several other options were already 
available, but as long as there is evidence of a move toward such diversification, 
the argument may be offered as the purpose behind creation of these courts. In 
Orange County, the creation of an integrated collaborative court program in 
addition to the gender-segregated collaborative courts would be a move toward 
further diversification of the juvenile justice system. Creating a gender-integrated 
collaborative court would be helpful for the success of the diversity argument in 
Hawaii as well, but the creation of a program serving the individual needs of male 
offenders would be the first step. As highlighted in United States v. Virginia, a policy 
of diversity must do more than favor one gender. 
4. Individual Needs of the Juveniles 
Another purpose of gender-segregated courts is to serve juveniles’ individual 
needs. It is unquestionably an important state objective to ensure that youth 
services are available where they are needed. To that end, each gender faces issues 
that are unique to that gender. While boys and girls may share some of the same 
risk factors, such as poverty, child abuse, and living in dangerous neighborhoods, 
these risk factors tend to impact boys and girls differently.120 Young female 
offenders have higher rates of “‘internalizing’ mental disorders (e.g., depression 
and anxiety) while boys have higher rates of ‘externalizing’ disorders (e.g., ADHD, 
conduct disorder, and other behavioral problems).”121 Delinquent girls also 
“report being exposed to child abuse at a much higher rate than boys.”122 Ninety-
two percent of girls in the California juvenile justice system “report some form of 
emotional, physical, or sexual abuse,” whereas some studies report abuse rates for 
boys at around twenty-five or thirty percent.123 A potential reason for this 
discrepancy is the possibility that boys are less likely to report certain kinds of 
abuse.124 
Due to the differences between boys and girls, the gender-segregated 
dependency courts in Orange County “are meant to be ‘gender-responsive not just 
 
119. Id. at 535–36. 
120. Girls and Boys, supra note 33, at 2–3. 
121. Id. at 2. 
122. Id. at 3. 
123. Cauffman, supra note 38, at 130. 
124. Id. 
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gender-specific.’”125 In general, “girls respond well to the relationships they 
develop with the female social workers and mentors . . . while boys learn by 
doing.”126 The girls’ delinquency court in Hawaii also recognizes that 
“[r]elationships are important and fundamental to girls’ lives. Girls need time to 
talk, process their feelings and develop healthy relationships of trust as well as 
interdependence with other females.”127 
While these differences between boys and girls are important, it is difficult to 
distinguish the legitimate use of these differences from an impermissible reliance 
on stereotypes. A government action may not “ignore individual characteristics 
found in both sexes in favor of an average based on one sex.”128 In other words, 
in order for the government to take into account gender-based characteristics in 
legislation or programs, the characteristics must be “found in all (or some) women 
but no men, or in all (or some) men but no women.”129 Undoubtedly, boys and 
girls have biological differences, such as the marked effect of testosterone on the 
male brain.130 It does not follow, however, that these biological differences are 
exclusively found in only one sex. “Exposure to high levels of testosterone before 
birth . . . has been linked with aggressive behavior in both males and females.”131 
The distinctions between boys and girls offered as justifications for their 
segregation, such as their distinct tendencies toward mental disorders, or their 
varying needs for interpersonal relationships, are not characteristics entirely unique 
to one sex. “Normative males and females tend to exhibit asymmetric frontal 
brain activation, with boys having greater right frontal activation and girls having 
greater left frontal activation.”132 While this is evidence that a typical male brain 
works differently than a typical female brain, not all males and females have brains 
that function in the characteristic way. Antisocial females tend to exhibit more 
right frontal activation, and consequently do not often “exhibit the enhanced 
verbal abilities or emotion regulation associated with dominance of the left 
hemisphere, as is more commonly observed in normative girls.”133 This potential 
for differences in brain function between and among the sexes blurs the lines of 
what is “typical” behavior for each sex. In fact, “so far as appears, it is only 
physical characteristics which can be said with any assurance to be unique to one 
 
125. DeBenedictis, supra note 50. 
126. Id.; see Kiselewich, supra note 88, at 229–30. 
127. Activities and Community Service, HAW. GIRLS CT., http://www.girlscourt.org/activities 
.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).  
128. Brown et al., supra note 90, at 893. 
129. Id. 
130. Kiselewich, supra note 88, at 229–30. 
131. Cauffman, supra note 38, at 129. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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sex. So-called ‘secondary’ biological characteristics and cultural characteristics are 
found to some degree in both sexes.”134 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility that these gender-segregated courts could 
reduce gender stereotypes. To relate the issue to schools, “[i]n coed schools, it is 
often assumed that interests and talents are gendered.”135 Research shows that 
girls in coeducational settings are “more likely to hide their intelligence, lack self-
confidence, and shy away from ‘male’ subjects like math and science.”136 Boys also 
struggle in coeducational settings, “especially in areas such as reading and writing, 
where studies show that girls tend to outperform them.”137 Boys and girls seem to 
avoid subjects stereotypically associated with the opposite gender when they are in 
a coeducational setting. This may also apply in the Orange County Boys and Girls 
Court setting when the youths attend job fairs or visit universities. If girls and 
boys were able to participate in these activities separately, possibly they would be 
more open-minded to hearing and inquiring about the various opportunities 
available to them. This is a minor exception, however, to the general assertion that 
integration of the Boys and Girls Court programs would be beneficial for boys 
and girls. Certain events could possibly be segregated, but the programs as a whole 
would be integrated. This structure would allow boys and girls to interact in 
positive settings, which would help with their socialization skills. 
It is difficult to create a program designed around the differences between 
genders when there are some boys who have a greater need for the kinds of 
interpersonal relationships sought by girls, some boys who have internalizing 
disorders, and some girls who learn by doing rather than by cultivating 
relationships. A program focusing only on the general tendencies of the genders 
may not adequately serve a boy or girl who does not fit that general pattern. A 
program that recognizes these general differences between the genders and 
counsels youths with these tendencies in mind, but has the ability to recognize 
other tendencies, would better serve each individual juvenile. Further, a program 
that offers many programs to both boys and girls would give the youths the ability 
to pick the program that best serves their own particular interests and needs. For 
example, it would give a boy the opportunity to cultivate relationships and a girl 
the chance to learn by doing. 
These considerations are true both for dependency and for delinquency. On 
the dependency side, Orange County already has a Girls and Boys Court, but these 
courts should be integrated. On the delinquency side, Hawaii has only a Girls 
 
134. Brown et al., supra note 90, at 893. 
135. Lea Hubbard & Amanda Datnow, Do Single-Sex Schools Improve the Education of Low-Income 
and Minority Students? An Investigation of California’s Public Single-Gender Academies, 36 ANTHROPOLOGY & 
EDUC. Q. 115, 123 (2005). 
136. Kiselewich, supra note 88, 229–30. 
137. Id. 
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Court, so the need is especially present for an integrated court, or a substantially 
equal Boys Court, that takes into account the special needs of both boys and girls. 
In sum, programs should take into account the differences between boys and 
girls, as these differences exist and have a real impact on the lives of these 
juveniles. It is important also to recognize, however, that not every person fits into 
the typical gender roles, so programs that focus entirely on the traits that are 
generally true for each sex may not adequately serve those who do not fit 
traditional gender roles. An ideal program would be one where the staff members 
have gender-responsive training for both male and female issues and actually 
interact with both boys and girls. This way, staff members would have the 
resources to respond to juveniles who do not fit the traditional roles. 
5. “Separate but Substantially Equal” 
The above discussions lead to the question of whether the creation of paired 
but separate boys’ and girls’ courts is less constitutionally objectionable than the 
creation of either a boys’ or a girls’ court alone. The answer is likely yes, as long as 
the separate programs are “substantially equal.”138 As mentioned in Section II.B, 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia acknowledged that “single-sex 
schools with ‘substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs, 
funding, physical plant, administration and support services, . . . faculty[,] and 
library resources’” could survive equal protection scrutiny.139 Thus, two separate 
gender-segregated programs will likely meet intermediate scrutiny if they are 
substantially equal. 
An important counterargument is that the separation of the genders runs the 
risk of devolving into gender stereotypes, such as the assumptions that all girls 
thrive on relationships and that all boys prefer to do physical activities. To the 
extent that the Orange County and Hawaii collaborative courts are dominated by 
programs driven by stereotypical notions of boys and girls, separate may never 
truly be equal, nor even “substantially equal” as the law requires. If the Girls Court 
offers programming that some of the boys would benefit from but are not getting, 
or vice versa, some youths are deprived of what they truly need because their 
needs do not fall under common ideas of what each gender requires. It might be 
possible to avoid this kind of situation if each juvenile receives sufficient 
individual attention. In the case of the Orange County collaborative dependency 
courts, enough individual attention is given to each juvenile so that the court staff 
can recognize his or her individual needs. Because of this, separate may be capable 
of being equal in some circumstances. Assuming that “substantially equal” allows 
 
138. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
547 n.17 (1996). 
139. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 n.17 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 44 
F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting)). 
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for a certain level of inequality, this is a meaningful guideline for the 
constitutionality of these courts. 
As currently constituted, the collaborative court programs offered for boys 
and girls in both the delinquency and the dependency contexts are not 
substantially equal. In the case of Orange County’s two separate dependency court 
programs for the boys and the girls, this failing is related to the courts’ different 
foci. For example, Boys Court focuses more on gang violence and less on teenage 
parenting, whereas Girls Court is the opposite. Gang violence, however, is also an 
important issue in girls’ lives; anywhere from eight to thirty-eight percent of gang 
members are female.140 Also, teen parenting is important for boys to learn about, 
as boys become parents too. If, as mentioned above, sufficient individual attention 
is given to each juvenile so that the court staff recognizes any unique needs, this 
problem could be substantially avoided. 
A more important difference between the two courts is that girls have all 
same-sex role models, whereas boys do not. All members of the Girls Court are 
female, including the judge, a feature that the Girls Court staff members are very 
proud of.141 In the Boys Court, however, the judge and many of the attorneys are 
female. Some may argue that having a choice between male and female role 
models is more beneficial, so girls are actually at a disadvantage by having same-
sex role models. However, the relevant inquiry is not which gender is at an 
advantage, but rather whether the boys and girls are treated differently. Regardless 
of which role model structure is better, the courts are not substantially equal. 
The situation in Orange County is directly comparable to one the Supreme 
Court considered in United States v. Virginia.142 The Virginia Military Institute 
(VMI) was an all-male military academy that used specific types of “adversative” 
instruction.143 In response to litigation that originated with a complaint from a 
high school female seeking to gain admission to VMI, Virginia created the all-
female Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL).144 The Court analyzed 
the two programs and determined that the men’s and women’s programs were not 
substantially equal and the segregation was therefore unconstitutional.145 
The Hawaii delinquency Girls Court clearly does not meet the separate but 
substantially equal standard. Boys and girls are obviously treated differently in this 
setting because boys do not have a court process tailored to their specific needs in 
the way that girls do. While the juvenile justice system has historically focused on 
 
140. Joan Moore & John Hagedorn, Female Gangs: A Focus on Research, JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Rockville, MD), Mar. 2001, 
available at http://www.west.asu.edu/ckatz/gangclass/Section_1/female.pdf. 
141. Carroll, supra note 4; see also Welcome to Hawaiʻi Girls Court, HAW. GIRLS CT., http:// 
www.girlscourt.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
142. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520. 
143. Id. at 515. 
144. Id. at 526. 
145. Id. at 534, 547 n.17. 
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boys in general,146 boys do not have the same gender-responsive and 
individualized programming as girls do in Hawaii’s delinquency system. Arguably, 
the fact that the delinquency system was traditionally geared toward boys has 
created resentment toward boys as the “favored” ones and has led to increased 
focus on the girls and less focus on addressing boys’ issues. Christina Hoff 
Sommers, a former philosophy professor well-known for her critique of late 
twentieth-century feminism,147 points out that in society, “boys are resented, being 
seen both as the unfairly privileged gender and as obstacles on the path to gender 
justice for girls.”148 Boys are not, however, privileged in the current system; society 
has changed in the century since the creation of the juvenile justice system,149 and 
it follows that the issues boys face in society have also changed. This creation of 
an all-female court with no counterpart for males is similar to the facts of 
Mississippi University for Women, which involved an all-female nursing program with 
no male equivalent.150 That program was deemed unconstitutional in violation of 
equal protection, even though males could audit courses at Mississippi University 
for Women or go to a different coeducational school to obtain nursing training.151 
6. Summary—An Overall Look at Whether the Delinquency or Dependency Courts Meet 
Intermediate Scrutiny 
The best argument for the constitutionality of Orange County’s dependency 
Boys and Girls Courts is that they are separate but substantially equal. Presently, 
they do not meet this standard, primarily because the Girls Court has an all-female 
staff, whereas the Boys Court has a staff of men and women. Regardless of the 
good intentions that undoubtedly underlie the decision to structure the courts in 
this way, it cannot be considered equal to give same-sex role models to one group 
and not to the other. However, the other aspects of the courts are substantially 
equal. The structures of the programs are fundamentally the same, and many of 
the women on the Girls Court staff are also on the Boys Court staff. The 
programs have similar goals and implement them in similar ways. Each court is 
focused on achieving the best outcomes for the juvenile participants. Thus, in 
order to meet the separate but substantially equal standard, the Orange County 
Superior Court need only implement the same structure for its staffs, whether it 
chooses a same-sex model or a mixed-sex model. The decision to choose a 
structure involving an all-male staff for Boys Court and an all-female staff for 
Girls Court, however, will depend on the constitutionality of assigning staff 
 
146. Barnickol, supra note 30, at 441. 
147. Biography of Christina Hoff Sommers, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. PUB. POL’Y RES., http://www 
.aei.org/scholar/56 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
148. CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST BOYS 23 (2000). 
149. Burke, supra note 23, at 119 (“The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in Cook 
County, Illinois.”). 
150. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 (1982). 
151. Id. at 719, 721, 723–24 n.8. 
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members to the courts on the basis of gender. This discussion is fleshed out below 
in Part III. 
The argument with the greatest likelihood of success for the constitutionality 
of Hawaii’s delinquency Girls Court involves the exclusivity of the benefits 
afforded to the girls in the program. Exclusivity acts as a justification for the 
court’s segregation only if the benefits afforded the girls could not be provided if 
boys were present, which is arguably the case. Part of the court’s focus is to foster 
open discussions about gender-specific topics in court. Girls are expected to share 
personal information in these group settings, and they would arguably feel 
uncomfortable doing so if boys were present. For this reason, a strong argument 
can be made that introducing boys into this program would eliminate the elements 
of the program that are beneficial to the girls. If this does not serve to justify 
maintaining an all-girls court with no counterpart for boys, Hawaii Court Judiciary 
could look into creating a separate but substantially equal program for boys, which 
would put Hawaii’s program on the same constitutional footing as the Orange 
County dependency courts. 
The other cited purposes, such as concern for the individual needs of the 
juveniles, remedying past discrimination, and diversity of court programs are likely 
not going to be as successful for establishing the constitutionality of either court. 
Remedying past discrimination and diversity of court programs are compelling 
reasons for maintaining Girls and Boys Courts, but they are not strong enough to 
withstand intermediate scrutiny in this context. Each court is focused on 
addressing the individual needs of the juveniles, which is arguably more effectively 
done if the genders are segregated because of the gender-focused nature of the 
guidance given. However, because of the fact that the individual needs of each 
juvenile do not necessarily map onto the trends for his or her particular gender, 
the division may be based more on stereotypes than actual differences between 
the genders. When a particular juvenile has needs different from those of her 
peers, these courts will ensure that her needs are addressed, because the courts’ 
goal is to serve each juvenile. Thus, catering to the individual needs of the 
juveniles is ultimately served by the small, collaborative nature of these courts, 
rather than the gender segregation. Consequently, this important purpose is not 
substantially related to the gender segregation. 
Ultimately, a court may deem these gender-segregated collaborative courts 
constitutional under the theories described above. If Orange County implements 
the same staff structure in its Boys and Girls Courts, the courts may well be 
deemed separate but substantially equal. If a court determines that the Hawaii 
program will be less effective if integrated, it may be constitutional without the 
establishment of a substantially equal boys’ program. If not, Hawaii could consider 
establishing a boys’ court, which could satisfy the separate but substantially equal 
standard. 
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III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE GENDER-SEGREGATED COURTS 
Due to the fact that both of the Girls Courts discussed in this Note employ 
all-female staffs, another significant issue raised by these courts is whether they 
discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 or the Equal Protection Clause, both of which forbid discrimination on the 
basis of gender in hiring and job assignment.152 Because courts are government 
employers, equal protection applies in addition to Title VII. The analyses are 
closely related, and the two claims are often brought together.153 They are 
discussed in turn. 
A. Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes clear that it is an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to (1) “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual” or (2) “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.154 It shall 
not, however, be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ 
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those 
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide 
occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise.155 
While the BFOQ exception applies explicitly only to hiring and firing, “its 
operation also implicitly applies to employment opportunities. Thus, if an 
employer restricted the activities of an employee because the same was ‘necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise,’ then the 
employer would be relieved of his statutory obligations under the act.”156 
In the case of the Girls Courts, explicit gender discrimination occurs in the 
assignment of job opportunities rather than in hiring. Members of the Girls 
Courts’ staffs are not hired solely for the purposes of serving on the Girls Courts. 
The attorneys appear in the mainstream courts and the judges hear mainstream 
court cases. The social workers and probation officers work on many cases 
 
152. See generally Daniel M. Le Vay, Annotation, Sex Discrimination in Job Assignment or Transfer as 
Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 123 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1995). 
153. See 1 SUSAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, SEX-BASED EMP. DISCRIMINATION § 2:1 
(2011). 
154. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
155. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
156. Cianciolo v. Members of City Council, 376 F.Supp. 719, 722 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); see also 
Reed v. Cnty. of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing a BFOQ defense when employer 
assigned a particular shift on the basis of gender and stating, “facial gender-based discrimination is 
permitted if gender” is a BFOQ). 
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outside of the Girls Courts. The Orange County Superior Court and the Hawaii 
State Judiciary employ court staff. Thus, individuals are not explicitly hired for the 
purpose of working solely in the Girls Courts, but rather gender is considered in 
job assignment. There are, however, questions regarding whether maintaining a 
Girls Court means the employer must effectively hire more women staff because 
their services are in greater demand. Consequently, it is important to think not 
only about discriminatory job assignment in this situation, but also the possibility 
of discriminatory hiring. 
The BFOQ exception is interpreted narrowly.157 The Supreme Court has 
read the “provision to mean that discrimination is permissible only if those aspects 
of a job that allegedly require discrimination fall within the ‘essence’ of the 
particular business.”158 Another articulation of the Court’s interpretation is “that 
sex discrimination ‘is valid only when the essence of the business operation would 
be undermined’ if the business eliminated its discriminatory policy.”159 A BFOQ 
may not be premised on “stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”160 
The first step in determining whether gender qualifies as a BFOQ is to 
determine the “essence” of the business.161 The “essence” of the courts’ business 
is to address the needs of and rehabilitate youths in the dependency and 
delinquency systems. In the Girls Courts, role modeling is considered a very 
important aspect of the programs. In order to determine whether gender is a 
BFOQ in this instance, it is necessary to examine the treatment of gender as a 
BFOQ in other businesses focused on rehabilitation, counseling, and role 
modeling. 
Several courts have examined whether role modeling can justify gender as a 
BFOQ in the context of role modeling and rehabilitation. The only cases that 
found rehabilitation or role modeling alone as a justification for gender as a 
BFOQ were those involving detention facilities.162 Because of the substantial 
deference to detention facilities,163 the standard is less stringent regarding what 
satisfies the requirement for BFOQ. Other cases that determined role modeling or 
rehabilitation to be a justification for gender as a BFOQ generally involved 
situations where an individual’s privacy interests were also at play. In Healey v. 
 
157. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d. Cir. 1996). 
158. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and 
Agr. Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991)). 
159. Healey, 78 F.3d at 132 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977)). 
160. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333. 
161. Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528 (7th Cir. 1988). 
162. Id. at 1524 (reversing the district court’s decision that rehabilitation in a detention facility 
alone cannot be a justification for a BFOQ). 
163. Id. at 1531 (acknowledging that judgments of penal administrators “are entitled to 
substantial weight when they are the product of a reasoned decision-making process, based on 
available information and experience.”); Henry v. Milwaukee Cnty., 539 F.3d 573, 580 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(citing Torres with approval but noting this discretion is not unlimited). 
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Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, the Third Circuit examined the essence of a 
psychiatric hospital’s business to hold that gender was a BFOQ in that context. 
The court found the essence of Southwood’s business to consist of treating 
“emotionally disturbed and sexually abused adolescents and children.”164 The 
court recognized that “‘[r]ole modeling,’ including parental role modeling, is an 
important element of the staff’s job, and a male is better able to serve as a male 
role model than a female and vice versa.”165 The essence of the Hospital’s 
business in that case is very similar to the Girls Courts and Boys Court in that they 
all give guidance to adolescents with emotional issues, many of whom have been 
sexually abused. While the court in Healey recognized role modeling as an 
important element of that function, it treated role modeling as important for both 
males and females. For that reason, Healey does not directly map on to the Girls 
Courts and Boys Court, where same-sex role modeling is only emphasized for 
females. Healey suggests that gender may not be upheld as a BFOQ on the basis of 
role modeling unless role modeling is the essence of the business for both sexes. 
The Healey court also discussed the role that staff play in the rehabilitation of 
children and emphasized that, “[a] balanced staff is . . . necessary because children 
who have been sexually abused will disclose their problems more easily to a 
member of a certain sex, depending on their sex and the sex of the abuser.”166 
This argument works against maintaining an all-female staff because some of the 
girls may have suffered abuse by a female, in which case there would be only 
female staff members to turn to. In fact, statistics show that ninety percent of 
child sexual abuse is committed by males,167 leaving a ten percent chance that a 
female will be abused by another female. This statistic also counsels against having 
an all-male staff for boys, because they are also more likely to be abused by a male. 
Thus, the Healey court’s emphasis on a balanced staff and the importance of role 
modeling for both boys and girls indicates that Boys and Girls Courts should both 
have male and female staff members. Taking into consideration the argument that 
victims of sexual abuse may relate better with members of their own gender—for 
instance, because a victim may feel more comfortable talking about such things 
with someone who understands his or her perspective—a meaningful solution 
would still retain the possibility of same-gender interaction, while not requiring it 
in all cases. 
Healey also discusses privacy issues related to hygiene, sexuality, and other 
concerns of adolescent hospital patients.168 Child patients often must be 
 
164. Healey, 78 F.3d at 132. 
165. Id. at 133. 
166. Id. 
167. David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, 18 
FUTURE CHILD., 31, 31 (1994). 
168. Healey, 78 F.3d at 133. 
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accompanied to the restroom, implicating clear privacy considerations.169 The 
court considered these privacy elements of the business along with the therapeutic 
elements and found gender to be a BFOQ under the totality of the 
circumstances.170 Other cases upholding privacy concerns in support of a BFOQ 
arise in the context of businesses that similarly involve the housing of patients and 
physical contact with people in treatment. For example, privacy concerns can 
justify a gender-specific BFOQ for the personal hygiene care of mental health 
patients171 and the care of retirement home patients.172 Nursing care of obstetrics 
patients also raises privacy concerns because of the intimate nature of the 
interaction between nurse and patient.173 
The court in City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
found therapeutic purposes, where paired with privacy issues, to satisfy the BFOQ 
requirement.174 There, staff of a youth study center served as counselors for 
youths who had emotional and social concerns.175 In addition, the staff was 
required to perform physical body checks and observe the youths taking 
showers.176 In yet another case, Jatczak v. Ochburg, the District Court of Michigan 
considered role modeling as a justification for gender as a BFOQ in the context of 
a childcare worker position that required teaching work skills and professional 
behavior.177 The court compared the job to counseling the mentally handicapped, 
discussing a case where the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found 
gender as a BFOQ because the counselors held sex education and individual 
counseling sessions divided by gender.178 These counselors also helped clients 
with toilet training and dressing and served as role models.179 The Jatczak court 
distinguished the situation before it by noting that counseling and therapy were 
not provided by the childcare worker, and that there was no intimate body contact 
between the childcare worker and the clients.180 Again, role modeling and 
counseling were considered along with physical privacy concerns, and the Jatczak 
 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 134 (“We conclude that due to both therapeutic and privacy concerns, Southwood is 
an institution in which the sexual characteristics of the employee are crucial to the successful 
performance of the job of child care specialist.”) (emphasis added). 
171. Local 567 Am. Fed. v. Michigan Council 25, 635 F. Supp 1010, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
172. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978), aff’’d mem., 
591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
173. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (“There are few 
duties which a registered nurse can perform in relation to an obstetrical patient which are not 
sensitive or intimate.”), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). 
174. Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 300 A.2d 97, 102–03 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1973). 
175. Id. at 103. 
176. Id. at 101. 
177. Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
178. Id. at 704 n.4. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 704. 
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court found no BFOQ, partly because the privacy concerns were not involved. As 
these courts demonstrate, we must look at whether there are privacy 
considerations implicated in the Girls Courts. 
Because the Girls Courts and Boys Court do not involve the housing of, or 
physical contact with, the youths, it is unlikely that privacy concerns would 
support gender as a BFOQ. While some of the girls involved in the Hawaii Girls 
Court are housed in juvenile detention facilities, the court process itself does not 
involve housing. Other than the sensitive issues discussed with the girls during 
court proceedings, there are few, if any, privacy concerns to consider. The privacy 
concerns that have supported gender as a BFOQ involve actual physical issues, 
generally with personal hygiene in situations where a person is housed in a 
facility.181 
An argument can, however, be made that privacy concerns are at play in the 
Boys and Girls Courts even if housing and physical contact are not involved. 
Many of the girls in delinquency and dependency proceedings have suffered some 
form of abuse,182 and part of the mission of the Girls Courts is to help rehabilitate 
these girls. While discussions of abuse do not involve physical contact, which is 
present in most cases where the Court finds a privacy concern, one could make 
the argument that the discussions necessary for rehabilitation after abuse, 
especially sexual abuse, are so personal and intimate that they deserve privacy 
protection. Sensitive issues arise during these interactions, and girls will arguably 
only feel comfortable in a rehabilitative setting if surrounded by women. Also, a 
girl’s sexual abuser is significantly more likely to be male,183 in which case she will 
very likely feel more comfortable telling a female her most intimate feelings about 
the situation. Further, the fact that boys experience sexual abuse at lower rates 
than girls184 arguably supports maintaining same-gender staffs for girls only. If 
sexual abuse creates a need to talk to members of the same gender, and if boys 
experience less sexual abuse, boys may have less of a need to interact only with 
male staff. 
While these arguments are persuasive, it is not clear that they justify gender 
as a BFOQ. First, courts seem to view privacy as a justification for gender as a 
BFOQ only when physical issues are involved,185 so rehabilitation or role 
 
181. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133–34 (3rd Cir. 1996); see also 
Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F.Supp. 1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d mem., 591 F.2d 1334 
(3d Cir. 1979). See generally Local 567 Am. Fed. v. Michigan Council 25, 635 F. Supp 1010 (E.D. Mich. 
1986). 
182. Carroll, supra note 4; Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., supra note 31, at 3 
(“A national study found that 92 percent of incarcerated girls have experienced one or more forms of 
physical, sexual or emotional abuse before entering the juvenile justice system.”). 
183. Finkelhor, supra note 167, at 31 (ninety percent of child sexual abuse is committed by 
males). 
184. Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Comm., supra note 31, at 2; Carroll, supra note 4. 
185. Healey, 78 F.3d at 133–34; see also Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 
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modeling will not likely justify gender as a BFOQ unless physical privacy issues 
are present. Second, even if physical privacy were not necessary for role modeling 
or rehabilitation to justify gender as a BFOQ, it may not apply to all staff 
members. Gender may be a BFOQ for a girl’s therapist, lawyer, or social worker 
because those are the people with whom she discusses her most intimate 
thoughts. Other members of the court staff, however, are not generally involved 
as closely in the discussions with the girls, so the argument that they must be 
female is not as strong. For this reason, gender may be a BFOQ for particular 
individuals but perhaps not for the entire Girls Court staff. 
B. Equal Protection 
Equal protection analysis of potential gender discrimination in employment 
is similar to the Title VII analysis. As stated by the Supreme Court in Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, “[i]n the case of a state employer, the [BFOQ] exception would have to 
be interpreted at the very least so as to conform to the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”186 This does not mean “that the Equal Protection 
Clause requires more rigorous scrutiny of a State’s sexually discriminatory 
employment policy than does Title VII.”187 Thus, many of the same 
considerations relevant in Title VII considerations directly parallel the equal 
protection analysis, and the standard for the two is the same. 
To make a claim of employment discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause, “the plaintiff must prove that she suffered purposeful or intentional 
discrimination on the basis of gender.”188 Such discrimination will be tolerated 
only if it is substantially related to an important government purpose. 
As recognized in Schlesinger v. Ballard,189 affirmative action considerations may 
be important enough purposes to justify employment discrimination against 
males.190 However, this would require a showing of past discrimination against 
women in employment in the juvenile courts.191 Even if such discrimination did 
exist, these all-female staffs are not hired for the purpose of remedying past 
discrimination, but rather for role modeling and other such purposes. An 
 
1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978), aff’’d mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally Local 567, 635 F. 
Supp. 1010. 
186. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.20 (1977). 
187. Id. 
188. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004). 
189. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (“[T]he different treatment of men and 
women naval officers under §§ 6382 and 6401 reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, 
instead, the demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated 
with respect to opportunities for professional service.”). 
190. 1 SUSAN OMILIAN & JEAN KAMP, SEX-BASED EMP. DISCRIMINATION § 2:1 (2011). 
191. Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 506–07 (distinguishing Frontiero v. Richardson and Reed v. Reed, cases 
in which genders were treated differently because of administrative convenience rather than the fact 
men and women were dissimilarly situated). 
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important purpose in equal protection analysis must be the government’s actual 
purpose, not a rationalization for an action “in fact differently grounded.”192 
Many of the same considerations for the Title VII BFOQ analysis apply 
here. For example, role modeling, discussed in the Title VII analysis as part of the 
essence of the Girls Courts, is an important purpose for equal protection analysis. 
Hiring only females for these positions, however, is likely not substantially related 
to that purpose. As discussed in the Title VII analysis, girls would benefit from 
having both male and female role models, especially if they suffered abuse by a 
female.193 The fact that boys do not have all-male role models in Boys Court also 
arguably weakens this argument because if same-sex role modeling is an important 
government purpose, it should be viewed as such for both boys and girls in order 
for it to be seriously considered. One could challenge this by saying that girls 
respond more to the relationships they develop with their same-sex social workers 
and mentors than do boys, so it is not as important for boys to have same-sex role 
models.194 While this may be true, such an argument runs the risk of employing 
stereotypes, which the Supreme Court is particularly concerned about.195 
Rehabilitation is another important purpose that may ground the decision to 
maintain an all-female staff. Sensitive issues are discussed with the girls, and it is 
arguably important for them to be surrounded by females with whom they feel 
comfortable discussing the struggles they go through. But some girls may feel 
more comfortable talking to males about certain concerns, which limits the import 
of this argument. For example, if a girl has had a volatile relationship with her 
mother and was verbally attacked whenever she talked about boys, she may be 
more inclined to talk to a male about concerns she has about the opposite sex. 
Another girl may be more inclined to open up to a male if she has been sexually 
abused by a female. Thus, while creating the best possible environment for 
rehabilitation of the girls in Girls Court is an important purpose, it is arguably not 
substantially related to maintaining completely gender-segregated staffs. In 
addition, as indicated in the Title VII context, role modeling and rehabilitation 
likely cannot stand alone to justify a BFOQ, which means they likely are not 
important purposes that will satisfy intermediate scrutiny.196 
 
192. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 (1996) (“In cases of this genre, our precedent 
instructs that benign justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted 
automatically; a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for 
actions in fact differently grounded.”). 
193. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996). 
194. DeBenedictis, supra note 50. 
195. Cohen, supra note 91, at 105 (“Most commentators who have studied the Court’s 
jurisprudence with respect to sex have similarly concluded that the Court is most concerned with ‘the 
wrong of stereotyping.’”). 
196. See Healey, 78 F.3d at 133; see also Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 704 (E.D.C. 
Mich. 1982); Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 300 A.2d 97, 103–04 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1973). 
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C. Employment Discrimination Conclusions 
While the creators and members of the Girls Courts’ staffs strongly believe 
in the benefits of an all-female staff for girls, their stated purposes of role 
modeling and effective counseling are not likely to stand up to Title VII or equal 
protection scrutiny. The lack of same-sex role modeling for boys, together with 
the notion that a same-sex staff may not be beneficial at all if a juvenile would 
benefit from a mentor of the opposite sex, cut against role modeling as a BFOQ 
or important purpose. In addition, the fact that courts have not upheld counseling 
or therapeutic concerns alone as justifications for gender as a BFOQ in the Title 
VII context indicate that these concerns would likely not be upheld as important 
purposes in an equal protection analysis. Thus, the assignment of only females to 
positions in the Girls Courts likely violates Title VII’s prohibition against gender 
discrimination in hiring and job assignment. For this reason, if Orange County 
decides to make changes in order to make the Boys and Girls Courts substantially 
equal, one of the first steps it should take is to establish mixed-gendered staffs for 
both of the courts. The Hawaii Girls Court should also consider hiring both male 
and female staff members for its court. 
CONCLUSION 
Organizers and supporters of the Girls and Boys Courts celebrate their 
alternative approach to the court process, defined, as they see it, primarily by the 
courts’ same-sex nature. The most important factor to the success of these courts, 
however, is the sincerity of those involved and their desire to improve the lives of 
the youths in their courts. This desire has led to the creation of programs that 
allow for attention to the specific needs of each juvenile involved in the courts. It 
is important to acknowledge the effectiveness of these programs and recognize 
that their success is due not to their gender segregation, but rather to their 
creation and operation with the goal of providing the best possible environment 
for the youths in the juvenile justice system. 
The trend toward innovating the juvenile delinquency and dependency 
systems to focus more on the individual needs of the youths in these courts 
should be encouraged. My hope is that those who strive to make these changes 
can use this Note as a tool for the creation of courts that will serve their purpose 
of helping youths and will withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
  
